

# Security Best Practices for Databricks on GCP

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# 1. Introduction

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Databricks has worked with thousands of customers to securely deploy the Databricks [Data Intelligence Platform](#) with the appropriate features to meet their security, privacy and regulatory requirements. While many organizations deploy security differently, there are patterns and features that are commonly used by most organizations.

**Please note:** unless you are a security specialist, there should be no need to read this entire document. You can implement our security best practices by following the **Define, Deploy, Monitor** approach outlined below:

- **Define:** Review the security checklists provided for [most deployments](#) and [highly secure deployments](#) below.
- **Deploy:** Our [Security Reference Architecture \(SRA\)](#) Terraform templates make it easy to deploy Databricks workspaces that follow these best practices!
- **Monitor:** Use the [Security Analysis Tool \(SAT\)](#) for ongoing monitoring of adherence to security best practices.

This document will focus on data platform security best practices, regardless of the types of workloads that you are running. For a comprehensive overview of security best practices relating to AI workloads, please refer to the [Databricks AI Security Framework \(DASF\)](#).

## 2. Databricks architecture

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The Databricks [Data Intelligence Platform](#) architecture is split into two separate planes to simplify your permissions, avoid data duplication and reduce risk. The control plane is the management plane where Databricks runs the workspace application and manages notebooks, configuration and clusters. The compute plane handles your data processing. With serverless deployments, the compute plane exists in your Databricks account rather than your cloud service provider account.

If you're new to the Databricks platform, start with an overview of the architecture and a review of common security questions before you hop into specific recommendations. You'll see those at our [Security and Trust Center](#) and the [security and trust overview guide](#).

## 3. Typical security configurations

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Below, you will find the typical security configurations used by most customers. For simplicity, we've separated these into "most deployments" and "highly-secure deployments." Most deployments are as they sound – configurations that Databricks expects to be present in most production or enterprise deployments such as the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Configurations for highly-secure deployments are more representative of what might be seen in environments with particularly sensitive data, intellectual property, or in regulated industries such as Healthcare, Life Sciences, or Financial Services, such as the use of Private Service Connect or customer-managed keys.

Importantly, the recommendations outlined below are based on the types of configurations we see from our customers, who have different levels of risk tolerance. Because of this, and because every deployment is unique, the recommendations below are non-exhaustive and following them cannot guarantee that your deployment will be secure. Please review in the context of your overall enterprise security framework to determine what is required to secure your deployment and your data.

## Most deployments

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The following configurations are part of many production Databricks deployments. If you are a small data science team working with data that is not particularly sensitive, you may not feel the need to deploy all of these. If instead you are analyzing large volumes of sensitive data, we recommend that you review these configurations more closely.

- Leverage [multi-factor authentication](#) for all user access
- Restrict access to your account, workspaces and Delta shares using [IP access lists](#)
- Use [Unity Catalog](#) for centralized data governance
- Plan your [data](#) and [workspace](#) isolation models
- Deploy Databricks into a [customer-managed VPC](#) for increased control over the network environment. Even if you do not need this now, this option increases your chances for future success with your initial workspace(s)
- [Secure your GCS buckets & prevent public access](#)
- [Backup your GCS data](#)
- Manage your code with [Git folders](#) and [CI/CD](#)
- [Limit the number of admin users](#), enforce [segregation of duties](#) between regular and admin accounts and [restrict workspace admins](#)
- Run administrative tasks and production workloads with [service principals](#)
- [Manage access according to the principle of least privilege](#)
- [Use compute that supports user isolation](#)
- Configure and monitor [system tables](#)
- [Control & monitor workspace access for Databricks personnel](#)
- Use [OAuth tokens](#) and disable or restrict the use of Personal Access Tokens using [token management](#)
- [Avoid storing production datasets in DBFS](#)
- [Store and use secrets securely](#)
- Consider whether to [implement network controls for data exfiltration protection](#)
- [Restart clusters on a regular schedule](#) so that the latest patches are applied
- Use [Delta Sharing](#) & configure [recipient token lifetimes](#) for every metastore
- Implement a cost monitoring and charge-back strategy via [budgets](#) and [tagging](#)

## Highly secure deployments

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In addition to the configurations typical to most deployments, the following configurations are often used in highly-secure Databricks deployments. While these are common configurations, not all highly secure environments use all of these settings. We recommend incorporating appropriate items into your existing security practices, where informed by the [threat models](#) in the following section and your company's risk tolerance.

- [Consider post-deployment hardening steps](#) to limit the permissions to your environment

- Keep users and groups up-to-date using [SCIM](#)
- Consider front-end [Private Service Connect](#)
- Use back-end [Private Service Connect](#)
- Plan your [network](#) isolation model
- [Implement network controls for data exfiltration protection](#)
- Evaluate whether customer-managed encryption keys (for both [managed services](#) and [storage](#)) are needed for increased control over data at rest
- Consider whether to apply additional protections to your data such as [encryption](#) or [fine-grained access controls](#)
- [Use VPC Service Controls](#) to isolate your GCP resources from the internet, unauthorized networks and unauthorized GCP resources
- Consider whether your datasets require [GCS object versioning](#)
- Evaluate whether to use [token management](#) to prevent the use of personal access tokens
- Use [workspace bindings](#) to isolate sensitive datasets and environments
- [Restrict cluster creation rights](#) and use [compute policies](#) to enforce data access patterns and control costs
- Review and configure [workspace admin settings](#)
- Consider whether to apply restrictions on the use of [libraries](#), [models](#) and [code](#)
- Provision infrastructure via [infrastructure-as-code](#)
- [Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs](#)
- Design, implement & test a [Disaster Recovery strategy](#) if you have strong business continuity requirements

## 4. Databricks threat models

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Customers who are particularly security conscious may want to understand the threat models that might apply to platforms like Databricks and the controls they can leverage to mitigate specific risks. If you are looking to ensure that you're following best practices and don't have specific security concerns you are looking to protect against, you can skip this section and focus on the checklists provided above. The most common threat categories that come up in customer conversations are:

1. [Account takeover or compromise](#)
2. [Data exfiltration](#)
3. [Insider threats](#)
4. [Supply chain attacks](#)
5. [Potential compromise of Databricks](#)
6. [Ransomware attacks](#)
7. [Resource abuse such as crypto mining](#)

This section addresses common questions about these risks, discusses probabilities, and provides mitigation strategies.

## Account takeover or compromise

### Risk description

Databricks is a general-purpose compute platform that customers can set up to access critical data sources. If credentials belonging to a user at one of our customers were compromised by phishing, brute force, or other methods, an attacker might get access to all of the data accessible from the environment.

### Probability

Without proper protections, account takeover can be an effective strategy for an attacker. Fortunately, it is easy to apply strategies that dramatically reduce the risk.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.1 Leverage multi-factor authentication</a> for all user access</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to synchronize users and groups</a> and correctly deprovision users when they leave your organization</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.7 Use OAuth token authentication</a> to ensure that short-lived tokens are used for access</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.8 Enforce token management</a> to disable personal access tokens or set a maximum lifetime for them</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.13 Store and use secrets securely</a> to protect user and system credentials</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.2 Configure IP access lists</a> for your account, workspaces and Delta shares to restrict access to trusted public networks</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.3 Use GCP Private Service Connect</a> to restrict access to trusted private networks</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.4 Implement network exfiltration protections</a> to protect against data exfiltration following a successful account takeover attack</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.7 Restrict access to valuable codebases to only trusted networks</a></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to identify failed authentication, authorization and access attempts. Please refer to <a href="#">this blog</a> for some examples</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes</a> to identify credentials in your code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to manage users and groups</a> to disable / remove potentially compromised users</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.7 Use OAuth token authentication</a> to delete OAuth secrets, deactivate and remove service principals</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.8 Enforce token management</a> to revoke tokens and/or disable token authentication</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> so that the actions of potentially compromised accounts can be investigated</li> </ul>



## Data exfiltration

### Risk description

If a malicious user or an attacker is able to log into a customer’s environment, they may be able to exfiltrate sensitive data and then store it, sell it, or ransom it.

### Probability

While the probability of this type of attack is generally low because it presumes either a malicious insider or compromised account, it is not uncommon for these types of attackers to attempt to exfiltrate and then leverage data.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.11 Use service principals to run administrative tasks and production workloads</a> so that wherever possible users do not need direct access to sensitive data</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.2 Plan your data isolation model</a> so that sensitive data is protected by the appropriate level of isolation</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.3 Avoid storing production data in DBFS</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">2.4 Secure your GCS buckets &amp; prevent public access</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">2.5 Use VPC Service Controls</a> to restrict access to trusted networks</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.11 Configure a Delta Sharing recipient token lifetime</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">2.12 Additionally encrypt sensitive data at rest using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">2.13 Leverage data exfiltration prevention settings within the workspace</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">3.2 Configure IP access lists</a> to protect your Delta Shares</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.4 Implement network exfiltration protections</a> to restrict outbound access to trusted destinations</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.5 Isolate sensitive workloads into different networks</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">3.6 Configure a firewall for serverless compute access</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">4.2 Isolate sensitive workloads into different workspaces</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">4.3 Assign Unity Catalog securables to specific workspaces</a> to restrict access to securables that may contain sensitive data</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.5 Restrict usage to trusted code repositories</a> so that code cannot be easily exfiltrated from the environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to identify repeated failed authorisation requests, high numbers of reads and writes and changes to account and workspace settings that protect against exfiltration. Please refer to <a href="#">this blog</a> for some examples</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.2 Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs</a> to identify failed &amp; suspicious service account, data access and network access attempts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to manage users and groups</a> to disable / remove accounts that are under investigation</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> so that the actions relating to potential data exfiltration attempts can be investigated</li> </ul>

## Insider threats

### Risk description

High-performing engineers and data professionals will generally find the best or fastest way to complete their tasks, but sometimes that may do so in ways that create security impacts to their organizations. One user may think their job would be much easier if they didn't have to deal with security controls, or another might copy some data to a public GCS bucket or other cloud resource to simplify sharing of data. We can provide education for these users, but companies should also consider providing guardrails.

### Probability

Given the large number of ways that security protocols can be avoided, there is significant variability in the likelihood and impact of risks in this category. That said, most security professionals identify this as a significant potential risk to organizations.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to synchronize users and groups</a>, helping to ensure that users have the correct level of access</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.3 Limit the number of admin users</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">1.4 Enforce segregation of duties between administrative accounts</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">1.5 Restrict workspace admins</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">1.12 Use compute that supports user isolation</a> so that users &amp; workloads are isolated, even on shared compute</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.13 Store and use secrets securely</a> to protect user and system credentials</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.6 Protect your GCS data with soft delete</a> so that incorrectly overwritten or deleted data can be recovered</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.7 Backup your GCS data with dual-regions</a> so that full datasets can be recovered when necessary</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.12 Additionally encrypt sensitive data at rest using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">3.4 Implement network exfiltration protections</a> as the safeguards they provide against accidental insider exposure are similar to those provided against a malicious attacker</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.7 Restrict access to valuable codebases to only trusted networks</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.4 Manage code versions with Git folders</a> so that code is backed up outside of the platform</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.5 Restrict usage to trusted code repositories</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.6 Provision infrastructure via infrastructure-as-code</a> so that</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to identify destructive activities (high number of deletes within a session) and privilege escalation attempts (high number of permission changes within a session). Please refer to <a href="#">this blog</a> for some examples</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.2 Monitor system activities via Google Cloud Audit Logs</a> to identify failed &amp; suspicious data access and network access attempts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to manage users and groups</a> and disable / remove the accounts of potential insider threats</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.6 Protect your GCS data with soft delete</a> to restore incorrectly overwritten, deleted or corrupted data</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.7 Backup your GCS data with dual-regions</a> and restore full datasets where necessary</li> <li>• <a href="#">4.8 Implement and test a Disaster Recovery strategy</a> to recover your data if needed</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> so that the actions of potential accidental or malicious insiders can be investigated</li> </ul>

Protect	Detect	Respond
<p>environments can be recreated if necessary, and manual changes to production environments are not allowed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">5.7 Manage code via CI/CD</a> so that only approved code can be run in production environments</li></ul>		

## Supply chain attacks

### Risk description

Historically, supply chain attacks have relied upon injecting malicious code into software libraries. That code is then executed without the knowledge of the unsuspecting target. More recently, however, we have [started to see the emergence of AI model and data supply chain attacks](#), whereby the model, its weights or the data itself is maliciously altered.

### Probability

Without proper protections, supply chain attacks could be an effective strategy for an attacker. Fortunately, it is easy to apply protection strategies that dramatically reduce this risk.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">3.4 Implement network exfiltration protections</a> as the safeguards they provide against supply chain attacks are similar to those provided against a malicious attacker</li> <li>• <a href="#">4.2 Isolate sensitive workloads into different workspaces</a> so that users have more freedom to experiment with libraries in sandbox environments, but only trusted libraries are used in production</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.5 Restrict usage to trusted code repositories</a> so that untrusted code cannot be easily brought into the environment</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.7 Manage code via CI/CD</a> so that only scanned and approved code can be run in production environments</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.8 Control library installation</a> so that only scanned and approved libraries can be used for sensitive workloads</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.9 Use models and data from only trusted or reputable sources</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes</a> to automatically scan code, libraries, dependencies, models and model weights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes</a> to automatically scan code, libraries, dependencies, models and model weights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables and search</a> to identify the use of libraries with known vulnerabilities. Please refer to the following blogs for some examples:                         <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <a href="#">Scanning for Arbitrary Code in a Databricks Workspace</a></li> <li>◦ <a href="#">Monitoring Notebook Command Logs With Static Analysis Tools</a></li> </ul> </li> <li>• <a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> to identify library installs via notebook commands</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.8 Control library installation</a> to disallow access to libraries with known vulnerabilities</li> </ul>

## Potential compromise of Databricks

### Risk description

Security-minded customers sometimes voice a concern that Databricks itself might be compromised, which could result in the compromise of their environment.

### Probability

Databricks invests considerable resources into securing its [Data Intelligence Platform](#) and has a robust security program designed to minimize the risk of such an incident – see our [Security and Trust Center](#) for an overview of the program and relevant security controls. However, the risk for any company is never completely eliminated.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review the Databricks <a href="#">Security &amp; Trust Center</a> and consider any necessary process controls</li> <li><a href="#">1.14 Consider post-deployment hardening steps</a></li> <li><a href="#">4.7 Control &amp; monitor workspace access for Databricks personnel</a></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to monitor the activities of Databricks employees that you grant access to your environment. Please refer to <a href="#">this blog</a> for some examples</li> <li><a href="#">5.2 Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs</a> to identify                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Abnormal provisioning activity</li> <li>Suspicious or failed service account access attempts</li> <li>Suspicious or failed data access attempts</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review the Databricks <a href="#">Security &amp; Trust Center</a> and consider any necessary process controls</li> <li><a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to monitor the activities of Databricks employees that you grant access to your environment. Please refer to <a href="#">this blog</a> for some examples</li> <li><a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> to monitor the activities of Databricks employees that you grant access your environment.</li> <li>Prepare “worst case scenario” customer controls in the event of an active compromise:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove access to your data by revoking the permissions granted via your service accounts to your GCS buckets and/or revoking your <a href="#">customer-managed keys</a> (not guaranteed to be a reversible operation)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## Ransomware attacks

### Risk description

Ransomware is a type of malware designed to deny an individual or organization access to their data, usually for the purposes of extortion. Encryption is often used as the vehicle for this attack. In recent years, there have been several high profile ransomware attacks that have brought large organizations to their knees.

### Probability

The vast majority of data is stored within customers' own GCS buckets, which would present a far more appealing target for ransomware attacks. Therefore, while we provide a brief summary here, the most important security controls are those that customers configure for their own storage.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">2.1 Centralise data governance with Unity Catalog</a> to ensure that only time-bound, down-scoped tokens are used to access data</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.4 Secure your GCS buckets &amp; prevent public access</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">2.5 VPC Service Controls</a> to protect your resources from untrusted networks</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.6 Protect your GCS data with soft delete</a> so that incorrectly overwritten, deleted or corrupted data can be recovered</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.7 Backup your GCS data with dual-regions</a> so that full datasets can be recovered when necessary</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.9 Configure customer-managed keys for storage</a> so that you have more control and visibility over the encryption keys used to protect your data</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.10 Use Delta Sharing</a> to ensure that only read-only, time-bound, down-scoped tokens are used to access data</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.6 Configure a firewall for serverless compute access</a> to protect your resources from untrusted networks</li> <li>• <a href="#">3.7 Restrict access to valuable codebases to only trusted networks</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.6 Provision infrastructure via infrastructure-as-code</a> so that manual changes to production environments are not allowed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.2 Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs</a> to identify suspicious or failed IAM, data or CMK access attempts and attempts to modify GCS bucket configurations</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes</a> to identify credentials in your code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">2.6 Protect your GCS data with soft delete</a> to restore incorrectly overwritten, deleted or corrupted data</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.7 Backup your GCS data with dual-regions</a> and restore full datasets where necessary</li> <li>• <a href="#">2.9 Configure customer-managed keys for storage</a> and put a process in place to rotate and revoke keys where necessary</li> <li>• <a href="#">4.8 Implement and test a Disaster Recovery strategy</a> to recover your data if required</li> </ul>

## Resource abuse

### Risk description

Databricks can deploy large amounts of compute power. As such, it could be a valuable target for crypto mining if a customer’s user account were compromised.

### Probability

This has not been a prominent activity in practice, but customers will sometimes bring up this concern.

Protect	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.9 Restrict cluster creation rights</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">1.10 Use compute policies</a> to restrict the maximum size and types of compute</li> <li>• <a href="#">1.14 Consider post-deployment hardening steps</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.8 Control library installation</a> to reduce the risk of supply chain attacks that are designed to result in resource abuse</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.13 Use Organization Policies</a> to limit the resources that can be deployed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">5.1 Leverage system tables</a> to monitor billable usage</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.2 Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs</a> to identify abnormal provisioning activity</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes</a> to identify credentials in your code</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.11 Use tagging as part of your cost monitoring and charge-back strategy</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">5.12 Use budgets to monitor account spending</a></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">1.2 Use SCIM to manage users and groups</a> to disable / remove accounts that are under investigation</li> <li>• <a href="#">5.3 Enable verbose audit logging</a> so that the actions relating to resource abuse attempts can be investigated</li> </ul>

# Appendices

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## Appendix A – Security configuration reference

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The security configurations referenced throughout this document are described in more detail below. For ease of reference, these security configurations have been grouped into the following overarching security, compliance, and privacy principles:

- [Manage identity and access using least privilege](#)
- [Protect data in transit and at rest](#)
- [Secure your network and protect endpoints](#)
- [Meet compliance and data privacy requirements](#)
- [Monitor system security](#)

### *Manage identity and access using least privilege*

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The practice of identity and access management (IAM) helps you ensure that the right people can access the right resources. IAM addresses the following aspects of authentication and authorization: account management including provisioning, identity governance, authentication, access control (authorization), and identity federation.

#### 1.1 Leverage multi-factor authentication

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Databricks is natively integrated with [Google Cloud Identity](#) for single sign-on (SSO) but customers should also configure multi-factor authentication (MFA). Most Databricks customers require an MFA prompt during user login, either at login to Databricks or through a VPN requirement.

For the highest security environments, Databricks also advocates where possible for the use of physical authentication tokens such as FIDO2 keys. These keys augment traditional Multi-Factor authentication by requiring interaction with a physical token that cannot be compromised.

#### 1.2 Use SCIM to synchronize users and groups

---

SCIM (System for Cross-domain Identity Management) allows you to [sync users and groups between your identity provider \(IdP\) and Databricks](#). There are three major benefits of this approach:

1. When you remove a user, the user is automatically removed from Databricks.
2. Users can also be disabled temporarily via SCIM. Customers have used this capability for scenarios where customers believe that an account may be compromised and need to investigate
3. Groups are automatically synchronized

Databricks recommends that customers [sync users and groups from your identity provider to your Databricks account](#), [enable identity federation](#) and use SCIM provisioning to manage all users and groups within your account.

#### 1.3 Limit the number of admin users

---

As in most systems, administrators within Databricks have elevated privileges that should only be extended to a trusted few within an organization. Where possible, use automation via [Service Principals](#) to



perform administrative tasks, preferably via [infrastructure-as-code](#). This recommendation applies to all [Databricks admin roles](#).

#### 1.4 Enforce segregation of duties between administrative accounts

---

It is a general best practice across all of security that an administrator should not use their privileged accounts to perform day-to-day tasks. Databricks recommends that customers should maintain a segregation of duties between user accounts, ensuring that:

- The same user does not share multiple highly privileged roles (such as account and metastore admin)
- Databricks administrators who are also normal users of the Databricks platform use a separate user account for administrative versus day-to-day tasks

Where possible, use automation via [Service Principals](#) to perform all administrative tasks, preferably via [infrastructure-as-code](#). This recommendation applies to all [Databricks admin roles](#).

#### 1.5 Restrict workspace admins

---

By default, workspace admins can change the job owner or run as setting and generate on-behalf-of tokens for any service principal in their workspace. Databricks recommends configuring the [restrict workspace admins](#) setting to prevent this.

#### 1.6 Manage access according to the principle of least privilege

---

Within Databricks there are different [access control systems](#) for different securable objects. Databricks recommends assigning ACLs according to the principle of least privilege, and assigning them to groups rather than directly to users. For Unity Catalog securables, manage access at the lowest level in the [inheritance model](#). [This proposal](#) for persona based access control should help you to get started.

#### 1.7 Use OAuth token authentication

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Where possible customers should use OAuth [user-to-machine \(U2M\)](#), [machine-to-machine \(M2M\)](#) or [Google Cloud credentials authentication](#). OAuth reduces risk because U2M requires users to authenticate as they would via the UI and for M2M the credential in memory will typically be a short-lived access token. Whilst most code will need a way to read the secret in order to request a new access token, the secret can be stored securely (for example in a service like GCP Secret Manager) and pulled down only when a new access token is requested.

Databricks recommends that you use Google Cloud credentials authentication instead of OAuth M2M authentication for scenarios in which you need to authenticate with Databricks and other Google Cloud resources at the same time, which requires Google Cloud OAuth access tokens.

#### 1.8 Enforce token management

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Customers can use the [Token Management](#) API or UI controls to enable or disable personal access tokens (PATs) for REST API authentication, limit the users who are allowed to use PATs, set the maximum lifetime for new tokens, and manage existing tokens. Where possible we would encourage highly secure customers to use [OAuth token authentication](#). Where this is not possible, we would recommend that they provision a short maximum token lifetime for new tokens within a workspace. Customers can use the notebook provided [here](#) to assess personal access token usage within their Databricks account.

#### 1.9 Restrict cluster creation rights

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Using either [compute policies](#) or the [cluster creation entitlement](#), admins can define which users or groups within the organization are able to create clusters.

[Compute permissions](#) allow you to specify which users can perform which actions on a given cluster. Note that using the correct cluster isolation level is a consideration here too, and [shared access mode clusters](#), [SQL warehouses and serverless compute](#) should be preferred where possible.

## 1.10 Use compute policies

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Databricks admins can control many aspects of the clusters that are spun up, including size of clusters, available instance types, runtime versions and Spark configuration settings using [compute policies](#). Admins can configure multiple compute policies, allowing certain groups of users to create small clusters, some groups of users to create large clusters, and other groups to only use existing clusters.

## 1.11 Use service principals to run administrative tasks and production workloads

---

It is against security best practices to tie production workloads to individual user accounts, and so we recommend configuring [Service Principals](#) within Databricks. Service Principals separate administrator and user actions from the workload and prevent workloads from being impacted if a user leaves an organization. Within Databricks, you can configure [jobs](#) as well as [automation tools](#) to run as a service principal.

## 1.12 Use compute that supports user isolation

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Customers should use shared or assigned [access mode](#) clusters, SQL warehouses or serverless compute at all times, with a preference towards shared access mode, SQL warehouses and serverless. These compute types apply isolation boundaries between users & workloads.

If No isolation shared clusters must be used, then customers should [enable admin protection](#) so that admin credentials are protected in an environment that is shared with other users.

## 1.13 Store and use secrets securely

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Integrating with heterogeneous systems requires managing a potentially large set of credentials and safely distributing them across an organization. Instead of directly entering your credentials into a notebook, use Databricks secrets to store your credentials and reference them in notebooks and jobs. [Databricks secret management](#) allows users to use and share credentials within Databricks securely.

## 1.14 Consider post-deployment hardening steps

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For non-serverless workloads Databricks creates and owns a per-workspace service account with the minimal [permissions](#) needed to manage the workspace. Following workspace deployment, customers can take the following steps to further harden their Databricks environment:

- **Minimize the [permissions](#) for the workspace creator:** After workspace creation these permissions are no longer needed.
- **Compute Engine default service account:** Databricks uses the [Google Compute Engine default service account](#) to run GKE clusters. This service account has broad permissions by default, but customers can follow the [GKE hardening guidelines](#) to reduce the roles required to:
  - monitoring.viewer
  - monitoring.metricWriter
  - logging.logWriter
  - stackdriver.resourceMetadata.writer
  - roles/container.nodeServiceAccount
- **Domain restricted sharing:** If your Google Cloud organization enables domain restricted sharing, ensure that both the Google Cloud customer IDs for Databricks (C01p0oudw) and your own

organization's customer ID are in the policy's allowed list. You can add this to your policy at the project level instead of modifying at the organization level.

- **Configure Private Google Access & harden your [customer-managed VPC routing and firewall rules](#):** A comprehensive approach to [network exfiltration protection](#) is provided below, but some customers may simply want to configure [Google Private Access](#) and harden their VPC firewall and routing table rules. Please refer to our [documentation](#) for a step-by-step guide.

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## Protect data in transit and at rest

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Classify your data into sensitivity and criticality levels and use mechanisms such as encryption, tokenization, and access control where appropriate.

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### 2.1 Centralise data governance with Unity Catalog

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[Unity Catalog](#) offers a unified governance layer for data and AI within the Databricks [Data Intelligence Platform](#). With Unity Catalog, organizations can seamlessly govern their structured and unstructured data, machine learning models, notebooks, dashboards and files on any cloud or platform. This unified approach to governance accelerates data and AI initiatives while simplifying regulatory compliance.

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### 2.2 Plan your data isolation model

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[Unity Catalog](#) gives you the ability to choose between centralized and distributed governance models, as well as apply varying levels of isolation between datasets. Databricks recommends that you plan your [data isolation model](#) upfront, following the [best practice recommendations](#) provided.

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### 2.3 Avoid storing production data in DBFS

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By default, DBFS is a filesystem that is accessible to all users of the given workspace and can be accessed via API. This is not necessarily a major data exfiltration concern as you can limit access to accessing data via the DBFS API or the Databricks CLI using IP access lists or private network access. However, as use of Databricks grows and more users join a workspace, those users would have access to any data stored in DBFS, creating the potential for undesired information sharing. Databricks recommends that customers do not store production data in DBFS.

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### 2.4 Secure your GCS buckets & prevent public access

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GCS buckets are used for two roles within a Databricks deployment: the workspace storage buckets that Databricks creates automatically at workspace creation and the additional buckets in which you store your data. Following deployment, Databricks recommends taking additional steps to [Secure the workspace storage buckets](#). For the GCS buckets in which you store your data, it is your responsibility to verify that the buckets are protected and [encrypted](#) per your requirements and that [public access is not allowed](#).

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### 2.5 Use VPC Service Controls

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[VPC Service Controls](#) enable you to isolate your GCP resources from the internet, unauthorized networks and unauthorized GCP resources. Customers can use VPC Service Controls to create a security perimeter around their [compute](#) and [GCS buckets](#).

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### 2.6 Protect your GCS data with soft delete

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[Soft delete](#) provides default bucket-level protection for your data from accidental or malicious deletion by preserving all recently deleted or overwritten objects for a specified period of time. GCP [recommends](#) that you use soft delete instead of Object Versioning to protect against permanent data loss from accidental or malicious deletions.

## 2.7 Backup your GCS data with dual-regions

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Create regular backups of your GCS data, allowing you to recover it from accidental deletion or corruption. Although GCS doesn't have built-in backup and restore services, [dual-regions](#) are a good option for asynchronously backing up data across regions.

## 2.8 Configure customer-managed keys for managed services

---

Configure a [customer-managed key](#) (CMK) for scoped data stored within the Databricks control plane and serverless compute plane, such as:

- Notebooks
- SQL queries
- SQL query history
- Secrets
- Personal access tokens (PAT) or other credentials

Databricks requires direct access to this Cloud KMS key for ongoing operations. You can revoke access to the key to prevent Databricks from accessing encrypted data within the control or compute planes (or in our backups). This is like a "nuclear option" where the workspace ceases to function, but it provides an emergency control for extreme situations.

For more information on using a [customer-managed key](#) (CMK) with Databricks please refer to [Customer-managed keys for encryption](#).

## 2.9 Configure customer-managed keys for storage

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Configure a [customer-managed key](#) for scoped data stored within the compute and data planes, such as:

- The GCE persistent disks attached in the customer-managed compute plane
- The workspace storage buckets associated with a Databricks workspace
- The GCS buckets used to store your data

Databricks requires direct access to this Cloud KMS key for ongoing operations, but a customer-managed key helps meet compliance requirements and allows you to revoke access if required.

For more information on using a [customer-managed key](#) (CMK) with Databricks please refer to [Customer-managed keys for encryption](#).

Serverless compute resources do not use customer-managed keys for GCE disk encryption on compute nodes. Disks for serverless compute resources are short-lived and tied to the lifecycle of the serverless workload. When compute resources are stopped or scaled down, the VMs and their storage are destroyed.

## 2.10 Use Delta Sharing

---

[Delta Sharing](#) is the first open source approach to data sharing across data, analytics and AI. Customers can share live data across platforms, clouds and regions with strong security and governance. Follow the [Security Best Practices for Delta Sharing](#) when sharing sensitive data.

## 2.11 Configure a Delta Sharing recipient token lifetime

---

When [enabling Delta Sharing for a metastore](#), always ensure that recipient tokens are set to expire within a timescale (seconds, minutes, hours or days) that is proportional to the sensitivity of the data that might be shared.

## 2.12 Additionally encrypt sensitive data at rest using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

---

Databricks supports Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption to additionally encrypt columns of sensitive data at rest. Customers can use the [aes\\_encrypt](#) and [aes\\_decrypt](#) functions to convert between plaintext and ciphertext, using [secrets](#) to securely store the cryptographic keys. Additionally encrypting sensitive data at rest adds another layer of protection in the event that the underlying storage account and its encryption keys or cryptography become compromised.

## 2.13 Leverage data exfiltration prevention settings within the workspace

---

Databricks workspace admins can leverage [a variety of settings](#) that provide protection. Most admin controls are simple enable/disable buttons. Some of the most important ones are:

- Notebook results download
- Notebook exporting
- SQL results download
- MLflow run artifact download
- Results table clipboard features
- FileStore Endpoint

## Secure your network and protect endpoints

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Secure your network and monitor and protect the network integrity of internal and external endpoints through security appliances or cloud services like firewalls.

### 3.1 Use a customer-managed VPC

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For non-serverless workloads, Databricks requires the use of VPC in the customer's GCP account. Databricks recommends the use of a [customer-managed VPC](#) so that the [cross-account permissions required](#) are reduced and customers can integrate the Databricks VPC into their existing network architecture. This way, customers can deploy Databricks into a VPC that allows them to route traffic through their own network enforcement points ([such as a firewall](#)) and control access to data using [VPC Service Controls](#).

For serverless workloads, the compute plane network is managed and secured by Databricks. One less security configuration for you to manage!

### 3.2 Configure IP access lists

---

[IP access lists](#) restrict the IP addresses that can be used to access Databricks by checking if the user or API client is coming from a trusted IP address range such as a VPN or office network. Established user sessions do not work if the user moves to a bad IP address, such as when disconnecting from the VPN. Databricks recommends that customers configure IP access lists for their Databricks [account](#), [workspaces](#) and [Delta Sharing recipients](#).

### 3.3 Use GCP Private Service Connect

---

GCP [Private Service Connect](#) (PSC) allows customers to set up end-to-end private networking for their Databricks [Data Intelligence Platform](#). PSC can be configured between Databricks users and the control plane, between the control plane and the compute plane. Databricks recommends using PSC in

combination with [Google Private Access](#) to connect to GCP services such as GCS, and [VPC Service Controls](#) to keep your traffic private and mitigate data exfiltration risks.

For front-end PSC connections, customers can [restrict access](#) to a given workspace to either all VPC endpoints that are registered in your Databricks account, or to just an explicit set. The latter can be useful when very strict isolation between users of different Databricks workspaces is required.

Configuring back-end PSC ensures that your compute can only be authenticated over that dedicated and private channel.

For more information on using GCP [Private Service Connect](#) with Databricks please refer to [Enable Private Service Connect for your workspace](#).

For serverless workloads, networking between the control and compute planes is managed by Databricks using either GCP Private Service Connect or the GCP network secured with mutual TLS authentication and firewall policies that limit access to only valid IPs. One less security control for you to worry about!

### 3.4 Implement network exfiltration protections

---

By default, compute plane hosts within your GCP environment have unrestricted outbound network access via specific ports. If you use a [customer-managed VPC](#), you can restrict outbound traffic using [VPC Service Controls](#) and a firewall. Databricks has published a [blog post](#) that describes how to do this using a VPC Firewall, but it can be generalized to other network security tools [using details provided in the Databricks documentation](#). GCP also provides recommendations for how to use [firewalls](#) and [data exfiltration controls](#).

The TLS connections between the control plane and the compute plane cannot be broken, and so it's not possible to use a technology like SSL or TLS inspection. The custom TLS certificate that would be needed cannot be pre-loaded on the Databricks AMI that is built for all customers.

### 3.5 Isolate sensitive workloads into different networks

---

Customers can share a [customer-managed VPC](#) with multiple workspaces, but for sensitive workloads this is not recommended. Customers should isolate these workloads into [their own workspace](#) with their own [customer-managed VPC](#).

### 3.6 Configure a firewall for serverless compute access

---

For serverless workloads, customers can configure [stable project IDs](#) within their [VPC Service Controls](#) to ensure that only Databricks serverless compute projects can access their resources. This feature is currently in preview.

### 3.7 Restrict access to valuable codebases to only trusted networks

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Databricks recommends that customers restrict access to valuable codebases to only trusted networks. In order to use these code repositories within Databricks, customers can apply either [public](#) or [private](#) networking controls.

## ***Meet compliance and data privacy requirements***

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You might have internal (or external) requirements that require you to control the data storage locations and processing. These requirements vary based on systems design objectives, industry regulatory



concerns, national law, tax implications, and culture. Be mindful that you might need to obfuscate or redact personally identifiable information (PII) to meet your regulatory requirements. Where possible, automate your compliance efforts.

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#### 4.1 Restart compute on a regular schedule

Databricks compute clusters are ephemeral. Upon launch they will automatically use the latest available base image and container image. Users cannot choose an older version that may have security vulnerabilities, with the exception of out-of-support container images which are hidden from the UI but can be manually configured or may have been configured on a cluster before the release was hidden.

Customers are responsible for making sure that clusters are restarted periodically. Databricks does not live-patch systems--when a cluster is restarted and newer system images or containers are available, the system will automatically use the latest available images and containers.

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#### 4.2 Isolate sensitive workloads into different workspaces

While Databricks has numerous capabilities for isolating different workloads within a workspace, such as [access control lists](#) and [Unity Catalog privileges and securable objects](#), the strongest isolation control is to move sensitive workloads to a different workspace. This sometimes happens when a customer has very different teams (for example, a security team and a marketing team) who must both analyze very different data.

For highly secure environments, Databricks recommends that you allocate a dedicated project for each Databricks workspace. This means that all resources within the project are associated with and used for one Databricks workspace. This model is simpler and more secure than using a shared project. It is equivalent to the [Tenancy Unit](#) model used by Google Cloud products.

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#### 4.3 Assign Unity Catalog securables to specific workspaces

If you use workspaces to isolate users and data, you may want to limit access to Unity Catalog securables to specific workspaces in your account. These assignments (also known as bindings) can be used to restrict access to [catalogs](#), [storage credentials](#) and [external locations](#) that may access or contain sensitive data to specific workspaces.

Bindings can also be used to provide read-only access, which can be useful in certain scenarios (for example by giving a data scientist read-only access to production datasets for Exploratory Data Analysis).

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#### 4.4 Implement fine-grained access controls

For sensitive datasets, implement fine-grained access controls via [row filters and column masks](#).

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#### 4.5 Apply tags

[Apply tags](#) to sensitive datasets so that they can be easily discovered, identified and handled appropriately. Tags can be used to improve search and support [fine-grained access controls](#) including Attribute-based access controls (ABAC) which is in preview.

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#### 4.6 Use lineage

Use [lineage](#) within Unity Catalog to track the movement of sensitive data, improving data governance and allowing you to more accurately meet regulatory data subject requests.

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#### 4.7 Control & monitor workspace access for Databricks personnel

Databricks personnel cannot access customer workspaces or the production multi-tenant environments without customer consent. If you raise a support request, you can grant Databricks personnel temporary access to your workspaces in order to investigate an outage or security event, or to support your deployment.

Databricks recommends that customers configure [workspace access for Databricks personnel](#) to be Not enabled by default, and only grant access as needed on a time-bound basis. Databricks also recommends that customers monitor such access via their [system tables](#).

## 4.8 Implement and test a Disaster Recovery strategy

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While Databricks doesn't offer disaster recovery (DR) services, customers can implement their own DR procedures for their data stored in GCS, using either [cloud native backup services](#) or [Delta cloning](#). Customers can also implement [cross-region resiliency for mission critical workloads via Delta Live Tables](#).

Where customers need to be able to failover *entirely* to a separate DR site, they can use Databricks capabilities to create a cold (on standby) workspace in another region. Please refer to our [disaster recovery](#) guide for more information.

## Monitor system security

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Use automated tools to monitor your application and infrastructure. To scan your infrastructure for vulnerabilities and detect security incidents, use automated scanning in your continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines.

### 5.1 Leverage system tables

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[System tables](#) serve as a centralized operational data store, backed by Delta Lake and governed by [Unity Catalog](#). System tables can be used for a variety of different purposes, from cost monitoring to [audit logging](#). Databricks recommends that customers configure system tables and set up automated monitoring and alerting to meet their needs. The blog post [Improve Lakehouse Security Monitoring using System Tables in Databricks Unity Catalog](#) is a good starting point.

### 5.2 Monitor system activities via GCP Cloud Audit Logs

---

It is a security adage that you cannot trust the system to tell you when it is compromised, you must be able to observe the system from the outside. [System tables audit logs](#) are an extremely valuable feature for monitoring what users do, but many customers want an outside resource to help monitor that Databricks itself doesn't do something wrong.

Cloud provider audit logs such [GCP Cloud Audit Logs](#) provide a great mechanism for observing the actions of Databricks (and users) in the compute and data planes. They provide visibility into:

- Instance creation, to help identify bitcoin mining and also as a control for billing
- Outbound network connections, to help identify data exfiltration\*
- APIs calls made within the GCP account, to help identify account/key compromise
- Access to data using Unity Catalog as a secure data broker

Most customers have favorite tools in place to analyze cloud provider log data, but you can also analyze this in Azure Databricks.



\*If you have deployed a [network level protection](#) such as a firewall, then monitoring your firewall traffic logs is likely to be the best way to achieve this.

### 5.3 Enable verbose audit logging

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In some highly regulated domains it is a requirement to track every command that a user has run against the system. On Databricks this can be achieved via [verbose audit logging](#). Once configured, audit logs will be recorded in [system tables](#) whenever a query or command is run within your workspace.

### 5.4 Manage code versions with Git folders

---

Databricks recommends that customers use [Git folders](#) to manage and protect their source code, as per widely accepted software development best practices.

### 5.5 Restrict usage to trusted code repositories

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A workspace admin can [restrict which remote repositories users can clone from and commit & push to](#). This helps prevent exfiltration of your code and infiltration of untrusted code.

### 5.6 Provision infrastructure via infrastructure-as-code

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Using [infrastructure-as-code \(IaC\)](#) to provision infrastructure provides a number of benefits, including but not limited to:

- Reduced likelihood of configuration errors due to human error
- Reduced likelihood of configuration drift where secure baseline templates are developed
- Automatic reversal of configuration drift the next time the IaC tool runs
- Reduced likelihood of outages due to infrastructure being accidentally modified or deleted
- Faster recovery times in the event of an environment needing to be recreated from scratch, such as in a disaster recovery / business continuity scenario
- Reduced number of administrative users
- Reduced number of administrative users who also have day-to-day permissions

Databricks recommends that customers use infrastructure-as-code to provision both their cloud and Databricks infrastructure, preferably via [service principals](#) whose credentials are only made available when needed to highly trusted individuals.

Our [Security Reference Architecture \(SRA\)](#) Terraform templates make it easy to deploy Databricks workspaces that follow these Security Best Practices!

### 5.7 Manage code via CI/CD

---

Mature organizations build and deploy production workloads [using CI/CD](#), allowing them to better manage user permissions to production environments, integrate code scanning, perform linting, and more. When there is highly sensitive data analyzed, a CI/CD process can also allow scanning for known scenarios such as hard coded secrets.

### 5.8 Control library installation

---

By default, Databricks allows customers to install Python, R, or scala libraries from standard public repositories, such as pypi, CRAN, or Maven.

Customers who are concerned about supply-chain attacks can maintain [allow lists for trusted libraries](#) within Unity Catalog.

Customers can also host their own artifact repositories and configure Databricks to use these instead.

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### 5.9 Use models and data from only trusted or reputable sources

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Model and data supply chain attacks are growing more common, and therefore where possible organizations should only use models, weights and datasets from trusted or reputable sources such as the [Databricks Marketplace](#).

Where models or weights from untrusted sources must be used, customers should ensure that they are reviewed, [scanned for malicious or vulnerable content](#) and thoroughly tested before use. Where data from untrusted sources must be used, customers should ensure that extensive Exploratory Data Analysis has been performed.

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### 5.10 Implement DevSecOps processes

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Your data & AI code is probably the most important code base you have within your company and as such should be subject to at least the same level of scrutiny and assurance you apply elsewhere. Customers can perform static and dynamic analysis for both their [code](#) and their [models](#).

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### 5.11 Use tagging as part of your cost monitoring and charge-back strategy

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To track Databricks usage through to GCP resource billing you can [configure tagging](#) on compute or pools. Tags can be combined with the [billable usage system table](#) and [budgets](#) for a 360 view of spend and subsequent chargeback.

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### 5.12 Use budgets to monitor account spending

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[Budgets](#) enable you to monitor usage across your account. You can set up budgets to either track account-wide spending, or apply filters to track the spending of specific teams, projects, or workspaces.

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### 5.13 Use Organization Policies

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While a very coarse control, [GCP Organization Policies](#) provide an overarching control to prevent excessive resource consumption.

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## Appendix B – Additional Resources

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Many different capabilities have been discussed in this document, with documentation links where possible. Here are some additional resources to help you learn more:

1. Review the [Security and Trust Center](#) to understand is how security built into every layer of the Databricks [Data Intelligence Platform](#), the [platform architecture](#), the [security features available](#) and the [shared responsibility model](#) we operate under
2. [Download](#) and review the [Databricks AI Security Framework \(DASF\)](#) to understand how to mitigate AI security threats based on real-world attack scenarios
3. Download our [due diligence package](#) and request our Enterprise Security Guide and additional compliance reports from your Databricks account team
4. [Set up the Security Analysis Tool](#) against all workspaces, so that you can review your deployment configurations against our best practices on a continuous basis. ([Learn more](#))
5. The foundation of good security is a robust architecture. Check out our [Well Architected Framework](#)
6. Another of the pillars of good security is strong data governance, so make sure you take a look at our [Unity Catalog Best Practices](#)

7. For more content from our security teams, please review our [Platform & Security Blogs](#)
8. If you're more of a visual person, check out our [Security Best Practices YouTube series](#)